Corporate subscribers can read all team messages, including those written in private and secret chats. Companies are still reading the correspondence of employees, using DLP solutions for this. These are technologies for preventing information leakage, with their help you can monitor what a person is doing, as well as automatically analyze his correspondence by keywords. The Village found out from an information security expert what chats the boss can easily read, whether it is legal, and where confidential conversations can be held.
How do companies read employee correspondence?
Kirill Kerzenbaum
business Development Director Group-IB
There are several technical ways to track employee correspondence in the office. For example, by installing a special agent on each workstation. It can be embedded in the browser or the chat application itself, or it can intercept and decrypt traffic at the network equipment level. Both means using the so-called Man-in-the-middle technique.
Some messaging services that store chat history locally, such as Skype for Business, allow an IT service to view message logs without installing additional software. Interception of traffic from social networks and instant messaging services, in particular the web version of the Telegram messenger, is available in some DLP solutions.
Which messages are harder to read?
It is more difficult to intercept information from smartphones. On Android, you can also install a special DLP agent, but if the device belongs to an employee, not a company, then this can be done legally only with his consent. It is impossible to install such a program on an iOS platform if the device has not been jailbroken.
Correspondence cannot be legally accessed on any platform that uses end-to-end encryption. This applies to mobile messengers WhatsApp, Telegram and Viber. But again, in the case of using the web version of Telegram, access to the current correspondence is possible. It is also worth remembering that most messaging services allow you to store or archive your message history locally or in cloud services, in particular Apple iCloud or Google Drive. Having gained access to these archives, you can read the history of the correspondence of a particular person. But this can be done by a cybercriminal rather than an employer, since it is illegal.
Is it legal?
The legislation looks at this in two ways, in particular, judicial practice in Russia has examples when the courts sided with both the employer and the employee. The most reliable way to avoid legal claims is to prescribe this opportunity in an employment contract and obtain the employee's explicit consent for access, if necessary, to his official correspondence. At the same time, the employer does not have the right to monitor personal correspondence.
It is very important to note that such consent gives the employer the right to automated control of correspondence by keywords, but not total control of all messages and their manual processing. The court may interpret this as a violation of the right to privacy of correspondence, telephone conversations, postal, telegraph and other messages (Article 23 of the Constitution of Russia).
There are countries, in particular Germany, where the employer is legally prohibited from monitoring any correspondence, even official, even if the employee consents to this in the employment contract. This or that message can be read only with the permission of the employee and with his assistance.
Where is the best place to conduct correspondence in order to keep it secret from the authorities?
Correspondence should be carried out from personal mobile devices and only using services that use end-to-end encryption, in particular Telegram, WhatsApp, Viber. It's also better to do this without connecting to a corporate Wi-Fi network.
To protect your correspondence from access by third parties, including hackers, it is better to use secret or private chats. First, they usually have an extra layer of encryption. In addition, their history is not saved either on the device, or on the servers of the service provider, or in backups.
In December 2011, shortly after the first post-election rally on Bolotnaya Square, the head of "a universal means for communication and finding friends and classmates, which tens of millions of people use every day," Pavel Durov sent to the then first deputy head of the presidential administration (AP) and controller of the Russian political field A letter to Vladislav Surkov. The transmission link was the then press secretary of VKontakte, Vladislav Tsyplukhin, who, judging by the materials at the disposal of Novaya Gazeta, worked more for the AP than for his main employer (this is a slightly different story, although very symptomatic from the point of view of the authorities' attempts to manipulate social networks). Among his regular addressees are Surkov's right hand in the administration, the then head of the Department of Internal Policy (UVP) Konstantin Kostin, "writer" Sergei Minaev, deputy head of the Department of Internal Affairs Irina Fedina.
From the letter (more precisely, from two documents: Tsyplukhin's preamble and Durov's letter to Surkov) it follows that the VKontakte press secretary and his colleagues "blocked ... radical users." In addition, Tsyplukhin reports that he, "for example", helps the largest writer of the Russian land "Sergei Minaev ( the same one that "The Chicks". — A. K.) to increase the tension between the sides of the split opposition (Chirikova - Nemtsov, Bolotnaya - Revolution Square) ”. And he adds: “At the request of Minaev, under my control, the groups“ We are for Nemtsov, we are meeting at Bolotnaya ”and“ We are behind the square. Revolution, for Chirikova. " Now we are planning to cross the traffic of these two groups in order to provoke a conflict. "
Downright "The tail wags the dog" on a county scale ...
In a letter to Surkov, the head of VKontakte reminds: “As you know, we have been cooperating with the FSB and the“ K ”department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for several years, promptly providing information about thousands of users of our network in the form of IP addresses, mobile phone numbers and other information, necessary for their identification ”. Of course, this specific activity of the service, focused on “always staying in contact with those who are dear to you,” is justified by the highest state interests, including preventing the “spread of violence and chaos”.
There is also another benefit from the VKontakte social network, purely patriotic and, as it should be, anti-Western: “Thanks to our superb efforts in the technological and information spheres, we are able to restrain the monopolization of the Russian social networking market by Facebook, a process that has already taken place in almost all countries the world ".
"... will undermine the credibility of our network among passionate youth"
But this is not the secret meaning of the letter. The head of VKontakte and, apparently, the shareholders of the company are painfully torn between the interests of business and what can be metaphorically called “state interests”. That is, what is required of VKontakte - to block opposition in the domestic Internet space - contradicts the business interests of the social network: it loses customers and loses to competitors. Here is the fragment for which the letter was written: "Blocking the opposition communities on VKontakte will undermine the credibility of our network among passionate youth, which in the long term may nullify our technological and ideological efforts to contain the onslaught of foreign social networks on the domestic market."
It is characteristic that the letter was written in such a special Kremlin dialect, within which, of course, there is no concept of normal market competition, but there is “containment of the onslaught”. There are no interests of the client, but there is, as it were, the state interest and interests of the siloviki (“to disclose and suppress crimes” - obviously, committed by the very “passionate youth”).
Durov convinces Surkov that the imposed (apparently) model of behavior on VKontakte "will only lead to a serious competitive advantage for the Americans, the end result of which will be the loss of control on our part."
The head of VKontakte names alternative ways: "You can continue to implicit, indirect control over the Runet, or start blocking Internet resources at the national level according to the Chinese model."
Of course, the shareholders of VKontakte are “interested in maintaining stability in the life of the state,” and therefore Durov promises to come up with something else “to reduce the emotional tension in society”. At least in Chinese, at least ...
In conclusion - an elegant kniksen: "I will not hide either that I personally like the leaders of the presidential administration ..." Well, that's right - the nicest people. Only those who forced the head of the company to pay them rent for the services of “de-anonymizing” the Network, coming into contact not with Facebook, but with the FSBuk. Otherwise, apparently, it will not be possible to save the business. This is the basic problem.
Artificial reality
In a word, one can only sympathize with the leadership of VKontakte, and the shareholders of the domestic Network can only envy the old Zuckerberg: he is unlikely to report to the administration of the American president about his activities to seize the adjacent territories with his Facebook. Part of the commission "paid" to the authorities is personally the ex-press secretary of VKontakte, who almost in full time was forced to engage in manipulations on Twitter and other services, regularly reporting to the staff of the Presidential Administration and the artists who joined them. who answered “Yes” to the question “Who are you, masters of culture with?”.
As a result, VKontakte does not work for clients, but for a group of political manipulators who create a fake, artificial reality on the Internet - with fictitious conflicts, with people playing off the Internet, with young men and women who are already corrupted at a tender age, who are helped to create controlled services for manipulation of public consciousness. Again, this is a separate story, but along the way, the participants in all this hard work are forming, for example, such a thing as The Twitter Journal 2.0, which now operates under the slogan “Our robot collects links to articles from Russian publications in order to analyze their popularity later. You only read important news. " So this "robot", this Twitter-Golem, breathed life into the native Old Square. Accordingly, “only important news” is also a manipulative tool.
They have everything artificial, from a test tube. An artificial people who are being driven to the numerous Poklonny mountains. Artificial social movements and rallies collected for a reasonable fee. Artificial parents driven into the Hall of Columns. Artificial TV set with twisted counters. Artificial elections based on stuffing and "carousels". Artificial ratings with off scale statistical error. And even an artificial internet.
Yes, the documents date back to the time when other people were in the posts of the main manipulators. But even today, judging by the quality of artificial reality, nothing has changed. Perhaps the methods have become more straightforward, which corresponds to the character of Vyacheslav Volodin, who replaced Vladislav Surkov, but from this they have not lost their purely manipulative nature.
Comments
Vladislav TSYPLUKHIN, the former head of the VKontakte press service (worked until February 15, 2013):
- Neither I, nor especially Pavel Durov wrote any such letters. As a press secretary, I really communicated with the presidential administration, the State Duma, and the Ministry of Economic Development. The State Duma invited us to round tables on legislation, and at the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade we met with other Internet sites when issues of copyright were discussed. The presidential administration - they learned about the mechanisms of blocking communities, how it happens. Consulted.
This was actually before all the events related to the elections. After the first year of work, since 2011, I began to communicate with government agencies. When I became public, they began to contact me, offer to meet, to ask something, to find out something. Offer affiliate programs. For example, with the Administration, we tried to register representative offices of all regions of Russia on VKontakte. But they did not finish it to the end - about 10 communities registered, then they abandoned it.
Surkov came to our office, got acquainted with Pavel. We talked about Skolkovo. Vladislav Yuryevich asked if VKontakte was interested in moving, how we could be useful for this project. But after this meeting, as far as I know, they did not have any communications. The journalists were not present at the meeting, but the meeting was unclassified.
I spoke with Vladislav Yurievich twice. In principle, he was interested in my view of the Internet, of the media situation there. He asked what was going on with us, if we were planning to move to the West. Well, partly for the elections as well. I talked to someone else from the administration.
Those events (December 2011) I hardly remember: more than a year has passed. Then people from United Russia showed more interest in us. They tried to call me, asked about some communities. But I don't communicate with strangers by phone, and no one suggested meeting. Yes, after the elections, they also called from the Administration, asked: "Why is such and such a group not blocked?" I say, "Because there is no court order." After Pavel spoke (refused to close, at the written request of the FSB, on December 7, 2011, five opposition groups and pages of rallies, after which he was summoned to give explanations to the St. Petersburg prosecutor's office), everything turned into a public plane. There was noticeable attention from the press and government agencies, there were problems. Pavel then did not go to the prosecutor's office, and everything was hushed up.
After Surkov left, communication stopped altogether. I had no contact with the new administration.
Head of the VKontakte press service Georgy LOBUSHKIN:
Vlad ( Tsyplukhin. - E. K.), when he left, he only gave me the contacts of people from Medvedev's press service who maintain his VKontakte account. Sometimes they ask how they can do it, how do they do it, but these are, in general, very technical issues.
But to exchange such letters, I have little idea.
I have never been contacted. Paul, in principle, is rarely available for communication with anyone. With journalists, with officials ... He does not speak on the phone, does not use e-mail. I send emails to him through VKontakte or during a live meeting.
There has been a clear procedure for communicating with law enforcement agencies for a long time. We have employees in the security service who know what the request looks like, from whom it might come. At the request of law enforcement agencies, if there is a criminal case, and the FSB, we can provide personal data: ip-address, as a rule. The request must be motivated, we unfold unmotivated. By a court decision, we can present the correspondence - but these are very serious cases, we refer to the article on the secrecy of correspondence, we demand detailed explanations. I think that more than one crime was solved thanks to us.
At the request of Roskomnadzor, we block communities. We can close for personal reasons if there is cruelty or disgusting content. To simply close some communities - Paul categorically rejected, even then ( december 2011.— E. K.). This is his principled position - not to censor anything. Even if some information is spread about him. Sometimes there is some kind of garbage - "VKontakte is closing soon", all that. And he is categorically against us deleting it, although we asked him.
Interviewed
Elena KOSTYUCHENKO
Information periodically appears on the Internet that messages in the WhatsApp messenger and on the VKontakte social network can be read by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the special services of the Russian Federation. Such data annoys users. They want to be sure that their private messages are their world, their secret. However, is it really so. This can be well understood.
There is an opinion on the Internet that the special services can read every correspondence on social networks if they need it. However, it should be noted that private messages are protected by law and without a court decision, reading messages is illegal.
In the personal blogs of users, you can read that supposedly the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the FSB have long been reading correspondence in r and other messengers. Of course, these are not expert opinions and they are not supported by an evidence base. That is, Internet users intuitively believe that the special services are monitoring the correspondence, that's all.
As for the opinion of experts, back in 2016 it was proved in the USA that it would not be difficult for attackers or special services to read WhatsApp correspondence. Experts assure that everyone can get the encryption key at the time when the user changes it or the messenger itself does it.
The FSB has repeatedly stated that it can read users' correspondence, but this is done only by court order. An application is submitted, the court makes a decision. It is sent to the owners of the messenger and they are required to provide data on the accounts that are specified in the document. Another question is whether the user will know that he is being read. Most likely no.
For example, it is believed that the social network would not work in Russia if it refused to provide the Ministry of Internal Affairs with access to correspondence. Also, users noticed that after Pavel Durov left VK, the new management of the social network stopped arguing with the FSB and other bodies about providing access to information. In their opinion, this indicates an agreement to provide all the necessary information upon the first request.
If we talk about legal means, no one can have permission to read correspondence or other information without a court decision. However, Internet users are not sure of this, since more and more bills appear in the State Duma, which indicate that they can still read the correspondence. Russians complain about the emergence of control on the Web, where a citizen is not sure about the reliable encryption of his information.
The State Duma is developing bills to which society reacts negatively. For example, the so-called "Yarovaya package". According to the document, from October 1, 2018, all telecom operators are required to store user data for 30 days, including messages, photos, video and sound files.
The media reported that all this data is with the operator, but he must provide them to the special services at the first request. This means that the FSB and other services can read the correspondence and listen to conversations if the subscriber comes into their field of vision, and for this you just need to go to an uncoordinated rally or appear at a large protest rally several times.
Users who do not break the law can sleep well, but they are still worried about this topic, since it is unpleasant to know that someone can read your personal correspondence. Even if there is not even anything illegal in it, these are still personal messages that only the addressee has the right to read.
How the law did not take into account the features of encryption in the messenger and why it is so difficult to create a technical solution for special services.
To bookmarks
On the second day after the presidential election, Telegram of the FSB in the Supreme Court: the order of the department to provide the keys for decrypting the correspondence in the messenger was recognized as legal. One of the main questions following the meeting was the very understanding of the "keys" and how, in theory, cooperation between Telegram and the FSB might look like.
Why Telegram is threatened with blocking again
The issue of blocking Telegram has not been discussed for the first time. Until the end of June 2017, Roskomnadzor Telegram was blocked for lack of registration in the register of organizers of information dissemination. That conflict was unexpected: Durov gave a link to open information about the messenger, and the department itself entered it into the register.
In September, the founder of Telegram, Pavel Durov, for the first time about the FSB's requirement to provide keys to decrypt user correspondence ( "Information necessary for decoding received, transmitted, delivered and processed messages"). Telegram cooperated with the FSB and received an administrative fine of 800 thousand rubles from the court of the Meshchansky district of Moscow. Then the appeal of the company. In the Supreme Court (VS), representatives of Telegram (Agora's lawyers) demanded to invalidate the FSB order due to abuse of power.
The FSB insists that it is acting within the framework of the law, demanding to obtain "information necessary to decode" Telegram correspondence. Indeed, according to the position of the department, the use of decryption keys is illegal only if there is no court decision on it. But at the moment it is not known about the issuance of such decisions by Russian courts on any Telegram user (at least publicly).
Why FSB will find it difficult to read correspondence even with encryption keys
The FSB cannot access Telegram messages without decrypting messages. However, back in June 2017, in a dispute with Roskomnadzor, Durov said that it was technically impossible to provide keys for decrypting "secret" chats: “The owners of instant messengers do not and cannot have keys for decryption. These keys are stored only on the devices of the users themselves. "
The difficulty lies in the fact that the decryption keys in "secret" chats are constantly changing. Telegram uses the MTProto 2.0 protocol with the Perfect Forward Secrecy function, which provides automatic key change for each user after every 100 messages or once a week.
In standard “cloud” chats, an authorization key is used to encrypt each message - it is created for each user when the application is first launched and “almost never changes,” the protocol description says. However, this is not the only factor used in encrypting "cloud" chats - part of the key with which each message is encrypted is the hash of the message itself.
Why is it difficult to create a solution for reading correspondence in Telegram
The FSB will not be able to decrypt Telegram correspondence without up-to-date decryption keys. Even if we take only "secret" chats, it is not known whether the department will have time to process the data before changing the keys.
If we imagine that Telegram will nevertheless agree to fulfill the order of the FSB and regularly transfer the relevant keys, then the special service and the messenger will need to somehow automate this work. In this case, Telegram must provide a technical solution, but it is not clear whether the company will make this solution convenient for the FSB and whether it wants to do it in principle.
https: //www.site/2017-08-12/fsb_mvd_i_drugie_budut_chitat_vashu_perepisku_i_eto_narushaet_konstituciyu
Digital emergency
FSB, Ministry of Internal Affairs and others will read your correspondence
Pravda Komsomolskaya / Russian Look
The Ministry of Communications has published a draft order on the requirements for "organizers of information dissemination" on the Internet. This seems to be a purely departmental document, rather low in its status (not a law, not a presidential decree, not a government order) made a lot of noise. It has been compared to the imposition of a state of emergency, where civil liberties are severely restricted for the sake of security. The order lists in detail the data that the "organizers of the dissemination of information" must store for 6-12 months and, most importantly, provide the special services conducting operational search activities (ORD).
There are no fundamental innovations in the document. Let me remind you that the obligation to store and provide the special services with data about our correspondence was enshrined in the law "On Information" back in May 2014. It was then that the very "register of organizers of information distributors" appeared, in which everyone who leads "Activities to ensure the functioning of information systems and (or) programs for electronic computers, which are designed and (or) used to receive, transmit, deliver and (or) process electronic messages from users of the Internet".
Agree, this is a rather vague definition. It is not surprising that, in addition to Yandex, Rambler, VKontakte, Mail.Ru and other services, this register contains items such as a site about the outstanding Tatar singer Sara Sadykova or a site called World of Digital Photography. According to this definition, any Internet forum, any site with comments, any simple program or service for exchanging messages over the Internet must be included in the registry. Even online games about tanks, orcs or zombies - you can also exchange messages there! But, of course, first of all, these are instant messengers, social networks and postal services.
For brevity, we will call these "information dissemination operators" OPCs.
In that law, it was immediately said that it was the OPC that was obliged to store on the territory of the Russian Federation and transfer for operational search activities:
information on the facts of reception, transmission, delivery and (or) processing of voice information, written text, images, sounds, video or other electronic messages of Internet users and information about these users within one year from the end of such actions;
But the fact of receiving and transmitting information is not the information itself. And in 2016, another norm was added. OCR is obliged to keep
text messages of Internet users, voice information, images, sounds, video and other electronic messages of Internet users up to six months from the end of their reception, transmission, delivery and (or) processing.
It was also said there that the procedure, terms and volume of storage of the information specified in this subparagraph are established by the government of the Russian Federation.
As far as one can judge, the new document of the Ministry of Communications establishes this procedure. From the order of the minister it follows that operators of special services will be able to receive all the above information promptly through their own interface. That is, they will not have to go to Yandex with a request to read your letter sent last week: they can simply log into your mailbox remotely, see whatever they want, and leave. Or they can set up filters so that when the word "explosion", "bomb", "jihad" or, for example, "Navalny" is mentioned, your letter or message is immediately monitored.
Most of all, citizens were frightened by the list of information that operational services can receive. If the OPC concludes an agreement with the user, then the special services will be able to obtain all personal data in general: name, birth data, passport data, and so on. Now, when registering on social networks, they do not ask for passport data, but proposals that Whatsapp and VKontakte should be allowed only with a passport are often heard, and it can be assumed that the state will take such steps.
However, according to the current rules, until such agreements are concluded, the operatives will receive your phone number, IP address, date and time of sessions, location, information on payments, and, most importantly, the content of messages.
It turns out that we are finally entering the era of forced digital transparency, when all our correspondence, all our personal lives are potentially available to special services, including political investigation.Of course, there are reservations in the laws that such information can be obtained only in the course of operational-search activities, and such activities cannot be carried out illegally, infringe on civil rights and freedoms, blah-blah-blah. But let's face it.
First, we know that any citizen whom the state considers unreliable can easily become an object of operational investigative activity, becoming a figurant in a criminal case or even just a subject of development. Moreover, the law on operational intelligence directly states: wiretapping can be applied both to persons suspected of committing crimes (ranging from moderate gravity) and to those who may “have information” about such crimes. This formulation can be interpreted very broadly. May I have information about the crime? Theoretically, I can, at least that's what the investigator thinks. Who will check it?
Let me remind you right away that a “crime” today is not necessarily a murder or a terrorist attack. A "crime" may well be inciting hatred or insulting the feelings of believers, that is, your careless statement, or your friend, is enough to officially become an object of the ORD.
Secondly, what is even more terrible, there are cases when seemingly classified information obtained in the course of an independent reconnaissance patrol "leaks" from the operational agencies and falls into the wrong hands.
Let me remind you of the Yekaterinburg policeman Artyom Pismenny. The court found him guilty of selling information about the wiretapping of the Ural politician Yevgeny Roizman through an intermediary. And he sold it not to anyone, but to a former employee of the prosecutor's office, Alexei Karpov, who was later convicted of organizing contract killings. This man was an enemy of Roizman and had motives for killing the Ural politician. In his hands were data on the conversations and movements of Roizman: a good tip for the killer! Through his wife, he paid 300 thousand rubles for this. This is official information, the verdict was confirmed by the Supreme Court. The case was relatively high-profile, as it came to the surface. And what remains in the shadows? How much ORD data is sold and outsourced each day? Now it will not only be wiretapping, but also your mail, correspondence, communication with an accountant, even messages to friends or sexual partners.
You should not console yourself with the thought that your modest persona is not interesting to Lubyanka. Lubyanka - yes, it is not interesting. A major from your Ministry of Internal Affairs may be very interested. Maybe your competitors paid him, or maybe you had a fight with him in traffic. Or two years ago you were photographed at some meeting and you ended up in the base of the “E” center. And in addition to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the FSB, the FSO, SVR, customs and FSIN also have the right to conduct operational-search activities (and access to your correspondence).
The argument “respectable citizens have nothing to hide” here, unfortunately, does not work - when the state receives broad powers, it ceases to be interested in what category of citizens you belong to. Random people are imprisoned for VKontakte reposts - why not start imprisoning for words, pictures or videos sent in personal correspondence?
The strategy of the state is aimed at ensuring that citizens should not have secrets. Formally, the state does not interfere in the private life of citizens, but conditions are created when the possibility of such interference always exists. Now, according to the law, Internet services that are not included in the register cannot operate in Russia. And all services included in the register are required to open data for the FSB or the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Therefore, in theory, you should not be left with any possibility of secret correspondence using the Internet. In fact, many services that are not included in the register (Facebook, Gmail, Twitter and others) are still operating in Russia, but we see a trend: the state will strive to keep on the territory of the Russian Federation only those services that “comply with Russian laws”.
I put these words in quotation marks, because in fact all this violates the main law, the Constitution. It clearly states:
“Article 23. Clause 2. Everyone has the right to privacy of correspondence, telephone conversations, postal, telegraph and other messages. Limitation of this right is allowed only on the basis of a court decision. "Indeed, according to the law, the secret of correspondence and negotiations can be violated only by a court decision. But, judging by the letter from the Ministry of Telecom and Mass Communications, we are talking about a system of operational and constant interference in the correspondence of citizens. Obtaining judicial permission essentially remains on the conscience of the intelligence officers (and, as far as is known, judges almost always agree with the requests of the authorities to conduct an ORA, in fact it is a formality).
All this is being done, of course, in the name of a glorious goal - the fight against terrorism. The draft order of the Ministry of Telecom and Mass Communications and those pro-government commentators who rushed to defend the idea of \u200b\u200binterference in private life on social networks also refer to the laws on the fight against terrorism. They remind that now the FSB will be able to quickly identify terrorist cells, neutralize recruiters, and prevent tragedies and deaths.
This is most likely just an excuse. And the very effectiveness of such a measure looks questionable. Yes, it can be successful in the fight against recruiters inviting young people to IS, but I have little faith that the real terrorists preparing the explosions in Russia use VKontakte or Agent Mail.Ru for communication. Rather, they will use obscure, very small services or sites and send encrypted messages to each other through them. Or they will refuse Internet correspondence altogether, using the proven old-fashioned methods of conspiracy and encryption.
Although global terrorism is an unconditional evil, and each of its victims is tragic, I would like to remind you that both in Russia and around the world, the powers that governments receive to defend themselves against terrorism are inadequate to the statistical size of the threat. In Russia, 62 people were killed by terrorists in 2016. Yes, this is a tragedy, this is a sad figure. But 19 thousand people died from the use of low-quality water (official data of Rospotrebnadzor). Building a good water supply infrastructure is not so attractive from the point of view of gaining control over society, and this is why incomparably more attention is paid to the fight against terror. And often the real struggle is replaced by police measures aimed, rather, at political control.
Polina Nemirovskaya made a good comparison in the Telegram channel: even to inspect your backpack, a police officer must introduce himself, give reasons and invite attesting witnesses. And it will be possible to get into your correspondence, into your videos, into your conversations anonymously, quietly, without any reason. At the same time, we live in a time when the contents of the messenger are much more important, more intimate than the contents of a backpack.
If we accept that the fight against terror is just a pretext for tight control of the Internet, then what is the real reason? Probably, the fact that the state sees for itself a serious threat in free communication, which has grown many times over thanks to the Internet. In some ways it is right. While communicating, people discuss the problems of the state, have the opportunity to exchange negative information, including criticizing the government. What kind of authority would like it?
But at the same time, it risks overlooking the opportunities that a free Internet, free exchange of information, knowledge and ideas gives to Russian society. The Internet has given a huge country the opportunity to unite and interact on a new, digital level. The infrastructure of the Internet directly affects the economy through human capital. The world is striving for an economy of knowledge, an economy of ideas, and the Internet is the circulatory system of this economy. By roughly interfering in it, destroying Internet freedom, we slow down our development, throw the country back.